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Abstract 
This article aims to elaborate on the pre-Ghazzālī period Sufis’ approaches to the 
concept of knowledge. We know that Ghazzālī, as a milestone in the Islamic 
thought, satisfies in taṣawwuf after a long quest. He benefits from the Sunnī 
taṣawwuf already established before him. Therefore, the importance of the 
sources feeding Ghazzālī’s Sufi view is manifest. Thus, in this article, I focus on 
the ideas of the main figures of the Sunnī taṣawwuf regarding the concept of 
knowledge. Having stated concisely about what taṣawwuf is, the concepts of 
knowledge and gnosis were described. And then, the ideas of the Sufis on 
knowledge and its ways were examined. I concluded at the end of the research 
that the Sufis restrict human reason (ʿaql) into the worldly life while giving the 
intuitional knowledge priority. Also, they separate the reality (ḥaqīqa) from reli-
gious law (sharīʿa). For the former, intuitional knowledge is a necessity, while 
the human reason is useful and responsible for the latter. Finally, it is hard to say 
that compared to Ghazzālī, Suhrawardī, and Ibn al-ʿArabī, those Sufis have a 
consistent epistemology when they set forth their view. 
Keywords: Islamic Philosophy, Sufism, Human Reason, Knowledge, Gnosis. 
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Gazzâlî Öncesi Tasavvufun Ana Kaynaklarında Bilgi 
Öz 
Bu makalenin amacı Gazzâlî öncesi sufilerin bilgi kavramına yaklaşımlarını 
incelemektir. İslam düşüncesinde önemli bir dönüm noktası olan Gazzâlî’nin, 
dinî ve felsefî ilimlerin birçoğuna vakıf olduktan sonra, tasavvufta tatmin olduğu 
bilinmektedir. Onun tasavvuf anlayışında kendinden önce tesis edilen sünnî 
tasavvufun izlerini görmekteyiz. Bundan dolayı Gazzâlî’nin tasavvuf yönünü bes-
leyen bu kaynakların önemi son derece açıktır. Bu makalede Gazzâlî öncesi dö-
nemde sünnî tasavvufun önemli figürlerinin bilgi hakkındaki görüşlerine 
odaklanılmıştır. Kısaca tasavvufun ne olduğuna değindikten sonra bilgi ve ma-
rifet kavramları açıklanmıştır. En son olarak da sûfîlerin bilgi ve bilgiye erişme 
yolları hakkındaki düşüncelerine yer verilmiştir. Araştırma sonucunda ulaşılan 
düşünce ilk dönem sûfîlerin, aklı fizik alemi ve şeriatı algılama vasıtası olarak 
kabul ederken sezgisel bilgiyi hakikat konusunda daha güvenilir görmeleridir. 
Şeriat ve hakikat ayrımının söz konusu olduğu bu sistemde şeriat için akla, 
hakikat için ise sezgisel bilgi yolu olan keşf ve ilhama ihtiyaç vardır. Bu 
düşünceyi savunurken, Gazzâlî, Sühreverdî el-maktûl ve İbnü’l-Arabî gibi sufil-
erle karşılaştırılınca, ilk dönem sufilerin sistemli bir epistemolojiye sahip 
olduklarını söylemek biraz güçtür. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İslam Felsefesi, Tasavvuf, Akıl, Bilgi, Marifet.  
 
Introduction 
In this article, I will study the pre-Ghazzālī period Sufis’ ap-
proaches to knowledge and human reason (ʿaql) with a philosophi-
cal perspective. Most of the Islamic philosophy researchers have 
been in agreement about that Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) is a mile-
stone in the Islamic thought. He engaged greatly in rational 
knowledge and wrote about theology, Islamic jurisprudence, logic, 
and philosophy. Afterward, he propounded that it is possible to 
attain the knowledge of reality by following the way of taṣawwuf 
only. To explain this way and its reliability, he wrote some books 
such as Iḥyā’ al-ʿulūm al-dīn, Mishkāt al-anwār, and Iljām al-ʿawām 
ʿan ʿilm al-kalām.  
In addition to that Ghazzālī denoted taṣawwuf to be the way of 
reality, he harshly criticized philosophy and theology, which are 
among the rational disciplines.1 Ghazzālī, who did not have an ob-
ject to some rational sciences like mathematic, medicine, and phys-
 
1  Especially in his Tahāfut, he criticizes philosophy and charges the philosophers with 
the infidelity in three matters. Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, ed. Sulaimān 
Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-maʿrifa, 1966), 1st, 13th, and 20th problems; Abū Ḥāmid 
Ghazzālī, Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayn al-Islām wa al-zandaqa, ed. Maḥmūd Bayjū (Damas-
cus: s.n., 1992), 56. 
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ics, encouraged his readers to resort to human reason on some is-
sues. Thus, we may see many sentences from the works of Ghazzālī, 
where he underlined the significance of human reason.2 However, 
concerning religious subjects, especially ones associated with be-
liefs, he claimed to has rational knowledge been unreliable, and 
human reason has limits to attain the knowledge of reality. He di-
vided knowledge into two parts. The first is knowledge of praxis 
(ʿilm al-muʿāmala), and the second is knowledge of unveiling (ʿilm 
al-mukāshafa). And then, he gave limited permission to human 
reason in the first part only.3 As for the second part, because it is 
the way of the knowledge of reality, there is no place for human 
reason and rational knowledge at all. After Ghazzālī’s precise 
statements, his followers have been speaking out loudly the claim 
that the knowledge of reality is beyond the limits of human reason. 
Ghazzālī’s approach to human reason and rational knowledge 
is a subject of another specific research.4 This article focuses on the 
approach of the Sufis who lived in the pre-Ghazzālī period to hu-
man reason and rational knowledge. Those Sufis are the founders 
and the most important figures of the Sunnī taṣawwuf, which is the 
way that Ghazzālī followed.5 Thus, it is very clear that those Sufis 
were influential on Ghazzālī prominently.6 Those Sufis, who lay the 
foundation of the Sunnī taṣawwuf, are the following: Ḥārith al-
Muḥāsibī (d. 857)7, Abū Naṣr Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī (d. 988)8, Abū Bakr al-
 
2  For the human reason and its noble nature, see Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī, Iḥyā’ al-ʿulūm 
al-dīn, 4 vol. (Beirut: Dār al-maʿrifa, 1982), 1:83. 
3  Ghazzālī, Iḥyā’, 1:14, 3:388, 4:103, 137. 
4  For us to understand the approach of Ghazzālī to the human reason correctly, we 
should elaborate on his works about theology, jurisprudence, philosophy, and taṣaw-
wuf holistically. But, since taṣawwuf is the last station of Ghazzālī, as a Sufi, his ap-
proach to the human reason is particularly significant as well. In this respect, for the 
matter of the reason and rationality in Iḥyā’, see Emrah Kaya, “İḥyâ’u ʿulûmi’d-dîn’de 
Akıl ve Aklîlik,” Bilimname, 36 (2018): 135–164. 
5  Hâris el-Muhâsibî, er-Riâye: Nefs Muhasebesinin Temelleri, trans. Şahin Filiz - Hülya 
Küçük, 4th ed. (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2011), 9, 14; Ebubekir Muhammed b. İshak 
Kelâbâzî, Doğuş Devrinde Tasavvuf: Ta’arruf, trans. Süleyman Uludağ, 5th ed. (Istan-
bul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2016), 18; Abdulkerim Kuşeyrî, Tasavvuf İlmine Dair: Kuşeyri 
Risalesi, trans. Süleyman Uludağ, 9th ed. (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2017), 22-24. 
6  Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, al-ʿAql wa fahm al-Qur’ān, ed. Hussain Quwwatlī (Beirut: Dār al-
fikr, 1971), 103-105. 
7  Muhâsibî, er-Riâye, 20-21, 32; Muḥāsibī, al-ʿAql, 36-38, 68, 155; Ali b. Osman el-
Jüllâbî Hücvirî, Hakikat Bilgisi: Keşfu’l-mahcûb, trans. Süleyman Uludağ (Istanbul: 
Dergâh Yayınları, 2016), 34; ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwīrī, The Kashf al-
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Kalābādhī (d. 990)9, Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 998), Abū ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. 1021), ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwīrī 
(d. 1072)10, and ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 1074).11 In this arti-
cle, I will study the subject of knowledge and human reason using 
the main ideas of those Sufis. 
This article encompasses the resources of the Sunnī taṣawwuf 
of the pre-Ghazzālī period. It does not include the thoughts of 
Ghazzālī. Also, it excludes the Ishrāqī thought, on which Ghazzālī’s 
teaching was effectual in its improvement. As for the value of this 
study, it focuses on those primary resources of the Sunnī taṣawwuf 
holistically. It will provide an opportunity to researchers, who study 
for Ghazzālī, Suhrawardī al-maqtūl (d. 1191), and Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 
1240), to have access to the background of their thoughts regarding 
taṣawwuf. 
I will divide this article into three main parts. In the first part, I 
will explain what taṣawwuf was in the sight of those Sufis, and 
what they thought of taṣawwuf. The second part correlates with the 
subject of knowledge including the terms ʿilm and maʿrifa. In the 
third one, I will concentrate on the epistemologies, i.e., the way of 
knowledge, of those Sufis.  
1. Definition of Taṣawwuf 
Taṣawwuf, as one of the Islamic sciences, is a discipline that 
purposes a moral improvement and maturity of human beings. The 
foundation of taṣawwuf is based on the lifestyle of the Prophet Mu-
hammad and his close companions (ṣaḥāba). Some Muslims after 
the Prophet had kept continuing this lifestyle, which is asceticism 
(zuhd) and piety (taqwā), for two centuries. In the third and fourth 
centuries after the Prophet, some Muslims had added some other 
thoughts and teachings to this lifestyle so that, taṣawwuf came out. 
 
Maḥjūb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, trans. Reynold A. Nicholson (Leiden: 
Brill, 1911), 108. 
8  Ebû Nasr Serrâc, el-Lüma’: İslam Tasavvufu, trans. Hasan Kamil Yılmaz (Istanbul: 
Erkam Yayınları, 2016), XXXV-XLIII. 
9  Kelâbâzî, Ta’arruf, 12, 15, 20, 24. 
10  Hücvirî, Keşfu’l-mahcûb, 23, 33, 34, 37, 38. 
11  Kuşeyrî, Kuşeyri Risalesi, 5, 6, 13, 19, 20, 25, 49, 50; Kelâbâzî, Ta’arruf, 19; Hücvirî, 
Keşfu’l-mahcûb, 253 (fn:6); Güldane Gündüzöz, Tasavvuf Tarihinde Nazarî İrfan Gele-
neği: Tarih, Teori ve Problemler (Ankara: Fecr Publishing, 2018), 49, 55; Ekrem 
Demirli, İslam Düşüncesi Üzerine (Istanbul: Sufi Kitap, 2016), 21. 
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Hence, we may say that the concept of taṣawwuf includes some 
specific ideas in addition to the lifestyle based on asceticism and 
piety.12 
We may define the concept of asceticism as turning away from 
worldly pleasures, leaving sins, not valuing the world, eating a lit-
tle, sleeping less, not talking unless needed, engaging in worship, 
being patient, having contentment (riḍā), and being thankful al-
ways.13 As seen with this definition, which concentrates on the 
principles of asceticism, taṣawwuf is the way of morality and deeds 
(ʿamal).14 According to another explanation, taṣawwuf is the 
knowledge of states (ḥāl), which is a harvest of the acts.15 In other 
words, taṣawwuf expects the proximity of humans with God, not 
with the world.16 
Also, the most distinctive feature of taṣawwuf from the other 
Islamic sciences is the acknowledgment of unveiling (kashf) and 
inspiration (ilhām) to be an epistemological tool for attaining the 
truth. The confirmation of the position of sainthood (walāya) is also 
another feature of taṣawwuf distinguishing it from the other Islamic 
sciences.17 As related to those concepts, some explanations regard-
 
12  Kuşeyrî, Kuşeyri Risalesi, 95 (fn:1). 
13  Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī, al-Muqaddima fī taṣawwuf, ed. Yūsuf Zaydān (Beirut: 
Dār al-Jīl, 1999), 72; Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt al-ṣūfiyya, ed. Nūr al-
dīn Shurayba (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1986), 488. 
14  Kuşeyrî, Kuşeyri Risalesi, 57. 
15  Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Isḥāq al-Kalābādhī, Kitāb al-taʿarruf li-madhhab ahl al-
taṣawwuf (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1994), 58. The concepts of states (ḥāl) and sta-
tions (maqām) occupy a significant place in taṣawwuf. While a servant obtains the 
stations by his/her individual effort, the states are the divine blessing and bestowal. 
There is no place for individual effort here. But it is a meaning thrown to the heart of 
servant by God. As for the stations, the first of the stations is repentance (tawba), and 
then they continue as sincere penitence (ināba), asceticism (zuhd), and submission to 
God (tawakkul). See, Hujwīrī, Kashf, 181; 
ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī, al-Risāla al-Qushayrī, ed. Maḥmūd b. Sharīf (Cairo: Muas-
sasa dār al-Shaʿb, 1989), 133; Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm 
Maḥmūd (Baghdād: Dār al-kutub al-ḥadīth, 1970), 43. Also, see Franz Rosenthal, 
“Ibn ʿArabī between Philosophy and Mysticism: Sufism and Philosophy are Neighbors 
and Visit Each Other”, Oriens 31 (1988): 1–35. 
16  Even though asceticism is one of the most essential principles of taṣawwuf, according 
to Muḥāsibī, some Sufis go to extremes on this matter. Thus, Muḥāsibī criticized and 
refused those Sufis who in the name of asceticism do the mistakes such as omitting 
children, disregarding parents, abstaining from earning livelihoods, being imprudent, 
etc. Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, al-Riʿāya li-ḥuqūq Allāh, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir Aḥmad ʿAṭā (Bei-
rut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2009), 97.  
17  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 210; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 462; Muhâsibî, er-Riâye, 10-12. 
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ing taṣawwuf gain importance in terms of the subject of this article. 
On the center of those explanations, there are the concepts of the 
philosophy of taṣawwuf and the philosophical taṣawwuf.18 The 
former points out a lifestyle based on asceticism and piety and aims 
at a moral improvement of human beings. The latter comes into 
prominence with the doctrines concerning cosmology, epistemolo-
gy, and metaphysics.19 Nevertheless, anyone who follows at least 
one of these ways of taṣawwuf is a Sufi, and he/she is, after the 
prophets, among the most virtuous and selected servants of God.20 
So far, I have outlined the information about taṣawwuf. There 
are further things to say about taṣawwuf that has been alive since 
the period of the Prophet. However, such information is satisfactory 
in terms of the subject and aim of the work. In the next part, I will 
focus on the concepts of knowledge (ʿilm) and gnosis (maʿrifa), 
which occupy a paramount place in the teaching of taṣawwuf.  
2. Knowledge (ʿilm) and Gnosis (maʿrifa) 
The concepts of knowledge and gnosis are intertwined in the 
discipline of taṣawwuf. To discriminate these concepts from each 
other is not exactly possible. Hence, we may come across diverse 
meanings and features of the concepts. Although I try to examine 
them separately, we should bear in mind that they have no absolute 
distinction. At first, it is difficult to say that the Sufis’ approach to 
those concepts is systematic. The Sufis usually refer to outward 
 
18  As different from this kind of classification, there is another distinction between 
understandings of taṣawwuf: Ṣaḥw and Sakr. The way of ṣaḥw is the way of Junaid 
al-Baghdādī, Kalābādhī, Sarrāj, Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, Qushayrī, Sulamī, Hujwīrī, and 
Ghazzālī. The way of sakr is the way of Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī, Abū Saʿīd Abū al-Khayr, 
Mawlānā, Attār, Sanaī, and Yunus Emre. Hücvirî, Keşfu’l-mahcûb, 54, 253 (fn:6); Hu-
jwīrī, Kashf, 184; Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 85; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 153; Binyamin 
Abrahamov, Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis (Oxford: Anqa Publishing, 2014), 69.  
19  Kuşeyrî, Kuşeyri Risalesi, 24. According to Süleyman Uludağ, Muḥāsibī, Sarrāj, 
Kalābādhī, Hujwīrī and Qushayrī follow the philosophy of taṣawwuf, not the philo-
sophical taṣawwuf. It is possible to refer to Suhrawardī al-maqtūl and Ibn al-ʿArabī as 
the followers of the philosophical taṣawwuf. See Abū al-Alā ʿAfīfī, al-Taṣawwuf: al-
Thawrat al-rūḥiyya fī al-Islām (Beirut: Dār al-shaʿbi, n.d.), 14; Abrahamov, Sufis, 176. 
20  Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 18. For more detailed information about the term of Sufi see, 
Hujwīrī, Kashf, 34. Moreover, apart from the distinction, i.e. philosophical taṣawwuf 
and philosophy of taṣawwuf, according to Hujwīrī, there are the twelve schools of 
taṣawwuf as follows: Muḥāsibiyya, Qaṣṣāriyya, Ṭayfūriyya, Nūriyya, Junaidiyya, 
Sahliyya, Ḥakīmiyya, Kharrāziyya, Khafīfiyya, Sayyāriyya, Khallājiyya, and Ḥulmāni-
ya. Except the last two of them are authentic and reliable schools of taṣawwuf. Hu-
jwīrī, Kashf, 176-266.    
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knowledge (ʿilm al-ẓāhir) with the term of knowledge. The Sufis 
use this term sometimes to cover inward knowledge (ʿilm al-bāṭin) 
as well. Therefore, according to most of them, the noblest action is 
to be a learned person, who has knowledge.21 
For Hujwīrī, the means of knowledge are the following: hear-
ing, sight, taste, smell, and touch. God has made those sense organs 
as a door of the heart. So that all kinds of knowledge are attached 
to one of them.22 Regarding this explanation, we may assume that 
he means the outward knowledge only. However, as we will see in 
the lines ahead, there is another kind of knowledge, which comes 
to human beings without sense perceptions. 
The Sufis categorized knowledge in various ways. According to 
one of these classifications, knowledge comprises three kinds. They 
are the knowledge of the Qur’ān, the knowledge of Sunnah, and the 
knowledge of the realities of faith.23 For another classification as 
well, knowledge consists of three kinds. They are the knowledge 
from God (al-ʿilm minallāh), the knowledge with God (al-ʿilm 
maʿallāh), and the knowledge of God (al-ʿilm billāh). The first one 
is to know the divine attributes. The next one is to know the reli-
gious commandments and prohibitions (sharīʿa). As for the last 
one, it is gnosis (maʿrifa), which is, as a divine bestowal, the 
knowledge of the spiritual states and stations.24 
Besides these, we also know another classification. It points to 
a distinction among certain knowledge (ʿilm al-yaqīn), certain sight 
(ʿayn al-yaqīn), and certain truth (ḥaqq al-yaqīn). The first of them, 
belonging to the people of reason (ʿaql), is to know the religious 
commandments and prohibitions. The next one, belonging to the 
people of unveiling, is to know the state of dying. The last one, 
belonging to gnostics (aṣḥāb al-maʿārif), is to have the real 
knowledge concerning God that will be unveiled in the Hereafter.25 
 
21  Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 34.  
22  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 393. 
23  Abū Naṣr Sarrāj, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fi’l-taṣawwuf, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd (Baghdād: 
Dār al-kutub al-ḥadīth, 1970), 8. 
24  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 16; Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 215. 
25  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 381-382; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 171. In fact, in the Arabic text, Qushayrī 
uses the term “aṣḥāb al-ʿulūm” for the second group of people. However, Uludağ pre-
fers to explain it as “people of unveiling” in parenthesis. See, Kuşeyrî, Kuşeyri Risalesi, 
179.  
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As for the aim of knowledge, it is to fulfill the religious provi-
sions accurately. There are some sciences mandatory to know. Abū 
Ṭālib quotes the hadīth, “Seeking knowledge is an obligation upon 
every Muslim” and asks which knowledge the prophet meant here. 
And then, he responds as follows: knowledge of the heart, 
knowledge of gnosis, knowledge distinguishing lawful and unlawful 
things, knowledge needed to serve God, knowledge concerning the 
evils and delusions of the self (nafs), and knowledge of the one-
ness. Learning knowledge apart from these is not mandatory but 
recommended because the most beneficial one is knowledge of the 
religious provisions.26 Moreover, according to Hujwīrī, to learn sci-
ences such as astronomy, medicine, and mathematic is mandatory 
in proportion as their relation to religion. Otherwise, these are not 
mandatory sciences; they may even be considered useless.27 
Regarding the concept of gnosis (maʿrifa), the most extensive 
definition is that gnosis is a servant's highest recognition of God. 
This kind of recognition happens with the heart only. According to 
Hujwīrī, in the sight of scholars (ʿulamā), gnosis is the sound 
knowledge of God, while for Sufis, gnosis is the sound state (ḥāl) 
about God.28 
Furthermore, for some Sufis like Abū Saʿīd Kharrāz, gnosis is 
two kinds. One of them is a bestowal by God (wahbī), while the 
other is a result of individual effort (kasbī). However, according to 
Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, gnosis is God’s grace toward some servants, and 
it is not possible to have it with an individual effort. From the books 
of taṣawwuf, we know that gnosis, as a mystical experience, is a 
kind of knowledge based on divine revelation and inspiration. 
There is no place for human reason, sense perceptions, and plain 
texts (naṣṣ) in that knowledge or recognition.29 
 
26  Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb fī muʿāmalat al-maḥbūb, ed. Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm 
Muḥammad al-Riḍwānī, 4 vol. (Cairo: Maktabati dār al-turāth, 2001), 1:363-365; Su-
lamī, Ṭabaqāt, 301. 
27  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 11, 269; Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Bayān al-farq bayn al-ṣadr wa al-qalb wa 
al-fu’ād wa al-lubb, ed. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Sāyiḥ (Cairo: Markaz al-kitāb li’n-
nashr, 1998), 35. 
28  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 267; Sulamī, al-Muqaddima, 30-31. 
29  Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 56; Tirmidhī, al-Farq, 22; Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 37; Süleyman Ateş, 
Cüneyd-i Bağdâdî: Hayatı, Eserleri ve Mektupları (Istanbul: Sönmez Neşriyat, 1970), 
100. 
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As a functional explanation, we could say that knowledge is a 
guide that makes a servant arrive in God. As for gnosis, it is a 
recognition pointing out God directly. Knowledge provides infor-
mation, while gnosis conduces for the servant to attain divine reali-
ties. Knowledge is possible with education, while gnosis is possible 
with mystical experiences. Also, knowledge comes through created 
beings, while gnosis comes from God. Therefore, a division between 
scholar (ʿālim) and gnostic (ʿārif) is expectable inherently. Accord-
ing to Sufis, the former is one who memorizes expressions only, 
while the latter is one who grasps the meaning and reality of some-
thing.30 
When it comes to taṣawwuf, it is clear that gnosis is in a more 
notable position than knowledge. Hence, it is necessary to give 
more detailed information about gnosis. As aforementioned, gnosis 
is possible with mystical experiences and comes to the heart. At this 
point, the term khawāṭır (incoming thoughts to the heart) plays an 
important role. According to Abū Ṭālib, incoming thoughts to the 
heart are six kinds. They may stem from the self (nafs), Satan 
(shayṭān), soul (rūḥ), angel (malak), the human reason (ʿaql), and 
the Certainty (yaqīn). The first and second kinds are evil, while the 
third and fourth kinds are good. The human reason, which is in the 
middle of them, distinguishes good and evil from each other. As for 
the last one, it is the divine bestowal and blessing thrown to the 
hearts of some selected friends of God.31 
Besides Abū Ṭālib’s categorization, some Sufis also make dif-
ferent categorizations. For instance, according to Muḥāsibī, 
khawāṭır (incoming thoughts) are inviters calling the hearts to good 
or evil. For him, khawāṭır comes either from God, or the self, which 
commands evil, or Satan, who gives whispers to the hearts. As for 
Kalābādhī, he propounds that khawāṭır comes either from God, or 
angels, or Satan, or the self. Likewise, Qushayrī also emphasizes 
that khawāṭır is an address coming to the hearts and happens in 
four kinds. According to Qushayrī, khawāṭır that comes from angels 
are an inspiration (ilhām), khawāṭır that comes from the self are 
 
30  Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 230; Hujwīrī, Kashf, 382. Also, according to Uludağ, the source of 
gnosis is the heart, soul, inspiration, and unveiling. Hücvirî, Keşfu’l-mahcûb, 331 
(fn.2).  
31  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:324-325, 343; M. Mustafa Çakmaklıoğlu, İbn Arabî’de Ma-
rifetin İfadesi (Istanbul: İnsan Publishing, 2011), 515-517. 
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the reports of the self (hawājis), and khawāṭır that come from Sa-
tan are whispers (wiswās). If khawāṭır comes from God, it is 
khawāṭır of the Real (al-Ḥaqq), and no servant can oppose it.32 
The concept of khawāṭır includes the concepts of inspiration 
and unveiling as well. Sufis and researchers use both of them syn-
onymously in general. Inspiration and unveiling, as the divine be-
stowal, have a tremendous significance in the epistemology of 
taṣawwuf. Inspiration is used mostly for good thoughts occurred in 
the hearts and it is for the heart to hear God. The occurrence of this 
hearing depends on the disappearance of the negligence from the 
heart. In this way, God engraves the essence of the truth on the 
hearts of His friends. As for the unveiling, it is to disclose something 
that is hidden to the general people. For the friends of God, who 
are in the state of the unveiling, there is no need to contemplate on 
proofs of the truth because God has removed all veils between His 
friends and the Unseen (ghayb).33 
Yet another concept to express the gnostic knowledge is the 
concept of the Certainty (yaqīn). Sufis define this concept to be a 
light (nūr) generated by God in the hearts. Hence, it is a divine 
bestowal. A servant by this light perceives the realities and has a 
grasp of states about the Hereafter.34 According to Sahl b. Abdullah, 
the Certainty is in direct proportion to the increase of faith and is 
the opposite to doubt.35 For Abū Ṭālib, in each heart there are three 
 
32  Muḥāsibī, al-Riʿāya, 92-93; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 169-171; Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 308; 
Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 62. 
33  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:256, 356; Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 412, 422; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 159; 
Şahin Filiz, İslam Felsefesinde Mistik Bilginin Yeri, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Say Publishing, 
2014), 219. Having said that the unveiling and inspiration are synonymous, Uludağ 
has emphasized that they are real. Nevertheless, he criticizes some Sufis, who rest ex-
aggeratedly on these methods of knowing. To him, it caused Muslims not to give suf-
ficient attention to rational and experimental sciences. So much, some Muslim com-
munities in history could not establish ties with real life. However, Uludağ does not 
give a concrete answer to the question: which unveiling and inspiration would the 
people follow? Even though most of Sufis say that people should follow the unveiling 
and inspiration that are compatible with the religious law (sharīʿa), we will discuss 
this problem in the pages ahead, it is not an adequate answer. Since the unveiling 
and inspiration are the superrational ways of knowledge, we cannot test their accura-
cy by resorting to the religious law, which works in the scope of human reason. 
Kuşeyrî, Kuşeyri Risalesi, 321 (fn.139). 
34  Ali Tenik, Tasavvufî Bilgi (Istanbul: Litera Publishing, 2017), 45-59. 
35  There is also another term wajd (ecstasy) used synonymously with the inspiration and 
unveiling. It is possible with a divine blessing only and eliminates all doubts. Sarrāj, 
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meanings; the Certainty cannot depart from them. With the weak-
ening of those three meanings, the Certainty also weakens because 
they are in the place of the Certainty. Those three meanings are 
faith, knowledge, and the human reason. The shining of the light of 
the Certainty depends on those meanings. To him, the heart is like 
a lamp, human reason is similar to a candle, knowledge is similar to 
oil, and the wick is similar to faith.36 
So far, I have given descriptive information about the concepts 
of knowledge and gnosis by basing on the resources of the earlier 
Sufis. In the next part, I will touch on the reasons for a hierarchy 
observed between both of them and the ways of acquiring rational 
knowledge and gnosis. However, before moving to the next part, I 
would like to attract attention to a point. I said that gnosis is a di-
vine bestowal. Even though most Sufis define it as removing veils 
over realities, having a grasp of the situations in the Hereafter, and 
knowledge regarding the divine mysteries, some statements found 
in their books propel us to a query. 
For example, Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī in his Qūt al-qulūb quoted a 
word of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. ʿAlī said, “We do not have any hidden 
knowledge given by the messenger of God except the Qur’ān. But 
God gives His servants a comprehension (fahm) to understand His 
book.” Besides, having cited the verse that “He [God] gives wisdom 
to whom He wills”, Abū Ṭālib said, wisdom is comprehension 
(fahm) and grasp (fiṭnah). As for Sulamī, he quoted from Abū 
Muḥammad al-Murtaʿish as having said, “whisper impels a servant 
to a daze, while inspiration conduces to the increase of comprehen-
sion (fahm) and grasp (bayān).”37 In this case, what does a servant 
obtain from the inspiration and unveiling? Is it a kind of knowledge 
(ʿilm) or comprehension (fahm) he attains? This point deserves to 
elaborate because there is no place for doubt or mistake in the gno-
 
al-Lumʿa, 375-376; Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 82. For another interpretation, see Makkī, 
Qūt al-qulūb, 1:412, 3:1317. 
36  On the other hand, Abū Ṭālib says there are three degrees of certainty. The first one is 
the degree of witnessing (mushāhada) and belongs to men of truth (ṣiddīq). The next 
one is the degree of surrendering (istislām) and verification (taṣdīq) and belongs to 
the general believers and virtuous men (abrār). As for the last one, it is the degree of 
conjecture (ẓann) and belongs to theologians resorting to human reason in religion. 
Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 139; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 318-319; Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 102; Kalābādhī, 
al-Taʿarruf, 73; Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:328, 381. 
37  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:334, 413; Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 350. 
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sis, which, as a divine bestowal, is a pure and complete knowledge. 
In addition, the servant is not an executer (fāʿil) in this kind of ac-
quisition. As for comprehension, the servant can make a mistake on 
his comprehension because the servant is an executor here. Eventu-
ally, since this questioning is a subject of yet another research, I 
leave this here. 
3. Human Reason and Heart as Two Ways of Knowledge 
Sufis acknowledge two main ways to acquire knowledge. The 
first is the human reason, and the second is the intuition that in-
volves the revelation, inspiration, unveiling, dream, and vision. In 
this part of the article, I will examine how Sufis benefitted from 
those ways. At first, I will provide their definitions and then reveal 
their functions and scopes. 
According to Muḥāsibī, the concept of reason (ʿaql) has one 
meaning in reality. It is an instinct (gharīza) whereby people learn, 
sustain their worldly life, and separate beneficial things from harm-
ful ones. Besides, this concept has two subsidiary meanings as well. 
The first one is the comprehension (fahm), which helps people to 
understand everything heard and seen about their worldly and reli-
gious life. The second one is insight (baṣīra) and gnosis (maʿrifa), 
which comes from God as a divine bestowal. Through this insight, 
people can have a grasp of the value of the beneficial and harmful 
things about the Hereafter.38 
As for the concept of the heart, I should emphasize its signifi-
cant function in the acquisition of knowledge, rather than providing 
a specific definition. Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī examines the terms the 
chest (ṣadr), the heart (qalb), the heart of the heart (fu’ād), and the 
kernel (lubb). And then he propounds that the heart as the most 
comprehensive name includes all of them. The heart as the spring 
of the foundations of the truth is the place of the light of faith. To 
him, the chest is the outermost; the heart is in the middle of the 
chest. The heart of the heart (fu’ād) is in the middle of the heart, 
and the kernel as the innermost thing is in the middle of them. The 
 
38  Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, “Kitābu mā’iya al-ʿaql wa maʿnāhu wa ikhtilāfu al-nāsi fīhi,” in al-
ʿAql wa fahm al-Qur’ān, ed. Hussain Quwwatlī (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1971), 201, 210-
213; Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, “al-Qaṣd wa al-rujūʿ ilallāh,” in al-Waṣāyā, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir 
Aḥmad ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1986), 251-253; Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 
1:272; Tirmidhī, al-Farq, 57. 
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kernel supported by God and given only to believers is the human 
reason (ʿaql) at the same time.39 We may reach two conclusions 
from these statements. First, the kernel is not the same with what 
we mean by the human reason that gives rational knowledge with 
the help of consideration and inference. The second, even though 
Sufis do not always apply the heart and reason systematically, they 
point to their relations in some way. For example, according to 
Muḥāsibī, human reason is a light of the insight located by God in 
the heart. It is neither a matter nor a sense, but a light distinguish-
ing good and harmful thing. For Abū Ṭālib as well, the human rea-
son is an instinct located in the heart. In addition, according to him, 
the human reason in the heart is like the sense of sight in the eye.40 
In respect of the function of the human reason, Muḥāsibī de-
scribes the human reason as the spring of wisdom, the light of eyes, 
and the fortress of knowledge. People can present proofs for the 
knowledge of the Unseen (ʿilm al-ghuyūb), can predestine some-
thing before it happens, and can be aware of its results in ad-
vance.41 At the same time, we may see from Sulamī’s Tabaqāt, the 
first Sufis connect the human reason to religiosity and morality. 
According to most of them, a sane person is careful in keeping the 
limits of God, keeps away himself from false beliefs, obeys the 
Prophet, fears and remembers God, gives thanks to Him, contem-
plates the Qur’ān, and follows the religion. In other words, every 
sane person should walk on the path of religion, knowledge, and 
obedience.42 
The most remarkable point in the Sufis’ approaches to the hu-
man reason is that they consider it to be a mechanism controlling 
the self (nafs). Almost all Sufis give a place broadly for this subject. 
As knowledge is in question, this point is tremendously important 
to understand the role and limits of human reason. Muḥāsibī, espe-
 
39  Tirmidhī, al-Farq, 20, 55-58.  
40  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 3:1317, 1:343; Muḥāsibī, “Kitābu mā’iya al-ʿaql”, 204. For addi-
tional examples about the relationship between the heart and the human reason, see 
Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:261, 2:660; Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 384, 408; Hujwīrī, Kashf, 144. 
41  Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, “Kitābu fahm al-Qur’ān wa maʿānīhi”, in al-ʿAql wa fahm al-
Qur’ān, ed. Hussain Quwwatlī (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1971), 266. 
42  Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, Risāla al-mustarshidīn, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghudda (Beirut: 
Dār al-Islām, 1974), 126; Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 138, 189, 219, 272, 364, 416, 433; 
Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 510, 623; Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, Ādāb al-nufūs, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir 
Aḥmad ʿAṭā (Beirut: Muassasa al-kutub al-thaqāfiya, 1991), 37, 39, 124. 
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cially in his work entitled al-Riʿāya, stresses the relationship be-
tween human reason and the self. To him, the human reason pre-
vents the excessiveness of the self, keeps away human beings from 
Hell, eliminates the whispers of Satan, and it has to keep the self 
under control. A sane person should be pious because it is the es-
sential goal of human reason. Otherwise, the passion (hawā) locat-
ed in the self manages human beings and entices them away from 
the right way. Junaid also agrees with the statements of Muḥāsibī 
in this respect.43 
As for Hujwīrī, who gives more details on this point, he claims 
that the soul that does not have the faculty of the reason is imper-
fect. Moreover, Hujwīrī matches the soul with the human reason 
and matches the passion with the self. To him, as long as a person 
resists his self, he reinforces the soul and the reason, which are the 
place of the Divine mysteries. According to another Sufi, the fasting 
of human reason is the resistance to the desires of the self.44 
Besides, there is a controversial function of human reason. It is 
the question of whether the human reason can know about God. 
Muḥāsibī, who has various statements on this point, propounds that 
it is possible to understand the Qur’ān and to know God through 
human reason. To him, what the sun is to the eye, knowledge is to 
the human reason. Submission to God is possible with knowledge 
only. Thus, the supreme ascetic (zāhid) is one who is sane, and the 
excellent sanity as well is to know about God. Furthermore, as 
Qushayrī quoted from a Sufi, the human reason is a faculty creating 
proofs regarding God.45 Consequently, Sufis affirm the human rea-
son to be a good means to some extent. According to some of them, 
if God wants to do good to a person, He endows him a sound rea-
son whereby he reaches goodness, which is faith and oneness of 
God (tawḥīd).46 
 
43  Muḥāsibī, al-Riʿāya, 43, 58, 67, 249, 250; Muḥāsibī, “al-Qaṣd”, 229; Muḥāsibī, Ādāb, 
104; Muḥāsibī, al-ʿAql, 78; Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 121; Ateş, Cüneyd-i Bağdâdî, 15; Sarrāj, 
al-Lumʿa, 180. 
44  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 200, 207; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 112. 
45  Muḥāsibī, al-Riʿāya, 189; Muḥāsibī, “al-Qaṣd”, 247; Muḥāsibī, Risāla, 98; Muḥāsibī, 
“Kitābu fahm al-Qur’ān”, 318; Ateş, Cüneyd-i Bağdâdî, 141; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 26. 
46  Muḥāsibī, Risāla, 93, 166; Muḥāsibī, “Kitābu fahm al-Qur’ān”, 322; Hujwīrī, Kashf, 
207. 
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On the other hand, Sufis often stress that the human reason is 
not capable of knowing about God. Even though I mentioned above 
the statements of some Sufis like Muḥāsibī, Qushayrī, and Hujwīrī, 
the same Sufis have opposing ideas in this matter. There is no clari-
ty in this subject at all. According to some Sufis, every idea con-
cerning God in our minds is wrong. Whatever we imagine about 
God is far from Him. God is entirely beyond the scope of human 
reason because its responsibility is only to know created things. 
However, according to the other remarks, His quiddity (māhiyya) 
and attributes are unknown. Apart from this, human reason can 
know God’s existence and oneness.47 When we know the existence 
and oneness of God without comprehending His attributes, do we 
think we know Him adequately? Is it possible to worship Him with-
out knowing exactly? According to most Sufis, people can know 
God through revelation and inspiration only. However, this case 
requires more comments. 
Further, they have more serious and negative evaluations 
against the human reason.48 Confusingly, even Muḥāsibī, who has 
many positive ideas about the human reason, has some critiques. 
For instance, according to him, there is nothing more severe charge 
and more harmful than the human reason toward the Sunnah. 
When a servant desires to go into the way of the Sunnah with his 
reason and comprehension (fahm), the reason contests him.49 
Muḥāsibī is not alone in this kind of approach. According to 
Abū Ṭālib, the word zukhruf in the Qur’ān is a mutual name for the 
worldly ornaments and for the ornate speeches whereby the human 
reason deludes people. Abū Ṭālib claims that whoever attempts to 
 
47  Muḥāsibī, “al-Qaṣd”, 286; Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 58; Sulamī, al-Muqaddima, 32; Kalābādhī, 
al-Taʿarruf, 37, 39, 105; Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 202, 384; Hujwīrī, Kashf, 268-270; 
Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 17, 38, 495, 497; Muḥāsibī, “Kitābu mā’iya al-ʿaql”, 220. As for 
Abū Ṭālib, he defends that the oneness and attributes of God cannot be comprehend-
ed by the human reason because it is prone to neglect and deny the attributes. Makkī, 
Qūt al-qulūb, 3:1179, 1185, 1187; Bedriye Reis, “Kuşeyrî’nin Letâifü’l-İşârâtı 
Bağlamında Kalbin İdraki”, İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi 8/1 
(2019), 539. 
48  For critiques made by Sufis against using human reason, see Süleyman Uludağ, İslam 
Düşüncesinin Yapısı: Selef, Kelâm, Tasavvuf, Felsefe (Istanbul: Dergâh Publishing, 
2018), 131-151.  
49  The editor of the book warns readers about this expression of Muḥāsibī. For him, in 
the thought of Muḥāsibī, the human reason is very noble faculty human beings can 
have. The wrong thing is to use this faculty out of the intended purpose. Muḥāsibī, 
Ādāb, 50; Muhâsibî, er-Riâye, 96. 
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attain the knowledge of the divine attributes by the human reason 
rather than the light of Certainty, he does ascribe partners to God. 
In addition, according to Abū Ṭālib, God erases the oneness of God 
from the heart of believers who tries to understand everything 
through his reason.50 
Sufis claim that the human reason has been incapable of un-
derstanding some of the thoughts that come to the heart. Besides 
the knowledge regarding God, knowledge concerning the nature of 
revelation, the essence of the soul, mystical states, the ascension of 
the Prophet, and miracles of the friends (awliyā) exceed the limits 
of the human reason. According to Abū Ṭālib, to claim to have faith 
through a rational effort is to deny the blessing of faith because 
faith also is beyond human reason.51 Those kinds of evaluations 
about the human reason underlie a well-known distinction between 
religious law (sharīʿa) and the reality (ḥaqīqa). The former is in the 
range of human reason, while the knowledge concerning the latter 
is possible with divine inspirations and unveilings.   
According to Hujwīrī, the knowledge of reality (ḥaqīqa) has 
three principles: Knowledge of the oneness of God, knowledge of 
His attributes, and knowledge of His acts and wisdom. The 
knowledge of the religious law (sharīʿa) also has three principles: 
The Qur’ān, the Sunnah, and the consensus (ijmāʿ) of Muslims.52 
The former is what Abū Ṭālib describes as knowledge of the inward 
knowledge (ʿilm al-bāṭin) that is known by the heart only. As re-
membered, the outward knowledge (ʿilm al-ẓāhir) is in the scope of 
human reason. According to Abū Ṭālib, there is no relation between 
human reason and the knowledge of Certainty. It is because the 
human reason concentrates on corporeal beings that constitute the 
outward knowledge.53 As for Kalābādhī, he places the knowledge of 
reality in the highest degree that humans can attain. Some people 
may reach this knowledge, which belongs to selected Sufis, after 
grasping the knowledge of the oneness, knowledge of the religious 
provisions, and knowledge of the discipline of the self (nafs).54 
 
50  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:460, 3:1184, 1187; Ateş, Cüneyd-i Bağdâdî, 9; Sulamī, 
Ṭabaqāt, 262. 
51  Tirmidhī, al-Farq, 72-73; Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 383; Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 2:583; Hujwīrī, 
Kashf, 261; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 504. 
52  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 14. 
53  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:326, 337, 423. 
54  Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 58. 
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Selected people, who know about God, follow the Sunnah and 
the knowledge of Certainty. Ignorant people trust their reason only. 
According to Junaid, for someone attaining the reality of the one-
ness (tawḥīd), rational knowledge and thoughts are nothing more 
than whispers that need to be dismissed. To him, the human reason 
is just a coordinator to fulfill the necessities of servanthood.55 
Hujwīrī asserts that the human reason will be bewildered help-
lessly as long as it seeks the truth. As for Sarrāj, he considers the 
human reason to be a helpful device to help the truth by decaying 
the rational arguments and false ideas put forth by non-Muslims. 
Nevertheless, he also emphasizes the superiority of the knowledge 
of reality. Since the knowledge of reality is the culmination of all 
sciences, whoever has this knowledge may also know syllogism 
(qiyās), consideration (naẓar). But, scholars, who know syllogism 
and consideration, may not know the reality.56 Moreover, just as 
delusions of the self are veils over the hearts of common people 
(ʿawām), rational pleasures are veils over the hearts of selected 
people (khawāṣ). Since human reason is the mirror of the world, it 
reflects the world only.57 
We learn from those statements that Sufis accept the divine in-
spiration rather than the rational efforts to have a grasp of reality. 
They acknowledge the superiority of intuitional ways upon rational 
methods. Since Sufis experience particular spiritual states and sta-
tions, they can conceive complex problems that scholars and jurists 
cannot. According to them, while all sciences have a limit, gnosis 
has no end at all because it comes from God as a bestowal.58 Thus, 
they consider themselves to be the most qualified authorities after 
the prophets to understand the divine speech and to decree about 
religious issues. Their chests are open, hearts are bright (ḍiyā’), so 
their knowledge about God is very sound. Gnosis that they have is 
 
55  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:480; Ateş, Cüneyd-i Bağdâdî, 149. 
56  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 270; Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 26, 149, 457. 
57  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 2:1140, 3:1186. As related to this point, Hujwīrī says that gnosis 
should depend on religious law (sharīʿa), prophethood (nubuwwa), and Divine guid-
ance. However, in the previous pages, I explicated that gnosis, as the knowledge of 
reality, is different from the religious law. It is because the former is a divine bestow-
al, while the latter is to reach knowledge by using human reason from the Qur’ān and 
the Sunnah. Hujwīrī, Kashf, 271. 
58  Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 32, 37, 107, 287. 
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not something to understand by human reason and to reveal by 
writing in books.59 
So far, I have explained taṣawwuf, knowledge, gnosis, and the 
significance of inspiration to attain the knowledge of reality. Mean-
time, I used the term “selected” occasionally for some Sufis. Before 
I complete this article, I should briefly touch on some features of 
intuitional knowledge and that of those selected Sufis because this 
step is complementary to the subject. 
As said at the beginning, the primary principle of taṣawwuf is 
to discipline the self. It is a discipline regarding cleansing the mir-
ror of the heart and preparing the heart to acquire the reflections of 
divine inspirations. According to Muḥāsibī, it is the obligation to cut 
down all interest in the world. So, the heart can get rid of negli-
gence and acquires the knowledge of the Unseen.60 Having cited a 
well-known hadīth narration about the friends of God, Muḥāsibī 
claims to have those people hold the knowledge of unveiling.61 
Those Sufis who are selected receive their knowledge from God 
directly. God teaches them what they do not know. 
As for Abū Ṭālib, also he says, a servant can attain true 
knowledge through piety and Certainty. When the servant pursues 
the way of servanthood, God bestows him true knowledge. In this 
respect, Abū Ṭālib emphasizes the verse “ask the people of the mes-
sage if you do not know” (al-Anbiyā’ 21/7). To him, the people of 
the message are those who take knowledge from God. Their 
knowledge does not depend on books and teachers but depends on 
their sincere acts. They speak with the divine inspiration that is the 
way of true and beneficial knowledge. Abū Ṭālib also refers to the 
verse “And will provide for him from where he does not expect” (al-
Ṭalāq 65/3) and says that this godsend is knowledge provided by 
God as a gift. Moreover, he quoted from Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī, who 
claims that a real savant is not a person memorizing and then for-
 
59  Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 8; Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:310, 2:1001. 
60  Muḥāsibī, “al-Qaṣd”, 306-313; Muḥāsibī, “Kitābu fahm al-Qur’ān”, 312. On the other 
hand, it is possible to see some expressions in Muḥāsibī stating that actions do not 
cause a person to attain knowledge of the Unseen. However, we may understand this 
approach in a different way. He maybe wants to say that knowledge of the Unseen is 
not a mandatory result of actions but is the harvest of actions. Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, 
Sharḥ al-maʿrifa wa badhl al-naṣīḥa, ed. Majdī Fatḥī al-Sayyid (Ṭanṭā: Dār al-ṣaḥāba 
lil-turāth, 1993), 201; Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 389. 
61  Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, “Kitāb al-riqāq”, hadīth no:91. 
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getting the book of God, yet is one who gets knowledge from God 
whenever he wants without any studying and memorizing. Besides 
this sentence, Abū Ṭālib tells affirmatively about a Sufi who an-
swers questions by consulting with angels.62 
Kalābādhī’s approach also is in this way. He claims that God 
has create pure, good, and elite people among the ummah of the 
Prophet and taken away their selves from the world. Since they are 
sincere in their endeavors, they have the knowledge acquired with 
an individual effort. Additionally, since they are sincere in their 
religious acts, they are the recipients of divine inspirations. Accord-
ing to Kalābādhī, some Sufis like Muḥāsibī have both the 
knowledge acquired and the knowledge bestowed. Furthermore, 
Kalābādhī mentions two kinds of Sufis. The first one is murīd, who 
deals with ascetic discipline (riyāḍa) before attaining inspirational 
knowledge. The second one is murād, who attains inspirational 
knowledge before dealing with ascetic discipline. The former de-
mands God, while God demands and chooses the latter.63 
These statements force us to touch on the relationship between 
the divine selection and being the recipient of the divine inspira-
tions. After the prophets, God sends His friends to people to follow 
them. This kind of friendship depends on God’s will and choice 
only. Whomever God does not will, cannot be a friend of Him. Ac-
cording to Abū Ṭālib, God’s love for His friends is before their love 
for God.64 
This kind of privileged status of the friends provides them a 
chance to have special knowledge. For instance, Junaid propounds 
that a real and faithful disciple does not need books and ideas of 
scholars. It is because whomever God chooses is under divine su-
pervision. In the books of taṣawwuf, it is possible to find many nar-
ratives on Junaid and his intuitional knowledge. For example, alt-
hough Junaid was not keen to address the people, he began to 
preach because he saw in the dream the Prophet requesting him to 
preach. Moreover, according to Qushayrī, Junaid was talking to 
angels in his dreams. The angels asked some questions to Junaid, 
 
62  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:336, 341-342, 375; Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 32, 439. 
63  Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 3, 12, 107; Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 2:1048. 
64  Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 1-2; Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:315, 337, 2:1048; Kalābādhī, al-
Taʿarruf, 30, 50; Hujwīrī, Kashf, 212; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 440. 
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and then he answered them. And then, the angels confirmed his 
answers. In another narrative, a Sufi asked a question to Junaid. He 
answered in a way that this Sufi liked very much. The Sufi request-
ed Junaid to repeat the answer to note it down. Upon this, Junaid 
replied, “If the answer were mine, I would repeat it for you to note 
it down.”65 
Such narratives in the books are not about Junaid only. Ḥakīm 
al-Tirmidhī claims not to have written any word in his books by 
thinking. Ibrāhīm b. Adham speaks with Khiḍr and learns divine 
names from the Prophet David. Kalābādhī writes his book entitled 
Baḥr al-fawā’id, which is a commentary on hadīths, by abiding a 
directive of the Prophet seen in the dream. Kalābādhī wakes up, 
and then he finds next to him a sheet of paper, a pen, and some 
hadīth texts. So, Kalābādhī’s book elaborates on those hadīths. Fur-
thermore, an important Sufi, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Kattānī 
meets with the Prophet Muhammad twice a week regularly in 
dreams and attempts to know from the Prophet the answers to his 
questions.66 Besides those narratives, Qushayrī learns in a dream a 
kind of medical treatment from the Prophet to cure his sick son. As 
for Muḥāsibī, whenever he is about to eat food, which is dubious 
according to religion, God warns him by creating a unique sense in 
his finger. So, Muḥāsibī understands at that moment that the food 
is not completely lawful (ḥalāl) and gives up eating.67 
With all those narratives, we understand that Sufis are under 
divine control and supervision. Not only of their actions but also 
their knowledge is compatible with religion and divine approval. At 
that, Junaid’s words can be more meaningful. He says that he does 
not consider any information to be valuable and accurate more 
than our knowledge.68 As Hujwīrī underlines, taṣawwuf, as a whole, 
is based on the concept of friendship (walāya), and all Sufi sheikhs 
have been in agreement on this point. Also, friendship is in question 
always together with the intuitional knowledge bestowed by God.69 
 
65  Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 430; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 353, 613-615; Ateş, Cüneyd-i Bağdâdî, 11, 
17. 
66  Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 43, 92; Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 31; Hujwīrī, Kashf, 142; Kelâbâzî, 
Ta’arruf, 28; Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 119; Mustafa Kara, Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar Tarihi, 
14th ed. (Istanbul: Dergâh Publishing, 2017), 61. 
67  Kuşeyrî, Kuşeyri Risalesi, 18, Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 70. 
68  Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 239, 507. 
69  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 210; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 437. 
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Since Sarrāj considers Sufis privileged, he claims that those 
who oppose taṣawwuf are the outward scholars, who know well 
neither the Qur’ān nor the hadīths of the Prophet.70 As for Abū 
Ṭālib, he points out the conjecture to be the lowest one from the 
three degrees of Certainty. This lowest one belongs to rationalist 
scholars. To him, faiths of some people whose fates are wicked, 
depend on rational proofs.71 As said above, also Hujwīrī emphasizes 
a hierarchy dividing gnostic, who are aware of meaning and reality, 
from scholars, who memorize expressions only. Most Sufis pro-
pound that the outward scholars will never know the reality.72 
The fact that Sufis acknowledge a rigid separation between the 
world and religion is the main factor underlying all of their 
thoughts. For example, even to Muḥāsibī, who is one appreciating 
human reason most among Sufis, many scientific types of research 
making easy our life and making us conscious about God’s art, de-
viate us from our responsibility. This responsibility is only to disci-
pline the self and to abide by religion.73 
Conclusion 
In this article, I attempted to exhibit the approaches of the pre-
Ghazzālī period Sufis to the concepts of rational knowledge, gnosis, 
the human reason, and intuitional knowledge. Those Sufis are sig-
nificant figures in the history of Islamic thought. It is because not 
only they laid the foundation of Sufi teaching, but also Ghazzālī, as 
a milestone of the Islamic thought, benefitted from them remarka-
bly. 
Having exhibited all those expressions and thoughts, it can be 
said that the epistemology of the early Sufis is not steady. They use 
the terms the human reason, the heart, the kernel, and the chest 
inconsistently. Also, there is no standard usage of the terms gnosis, 
especially knowledge. However, when their statements are studied 
in-depth, we may see that they use the term human reason in two 
contexts. When they use human reason to compare with passion, 
they favor the former versus passion. When they use it to compare 
with the heart and intuitional knowledge, they favor the heart une-
 
70  Sarrāj, al-Lumʿa, 33, 150. 
71  Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:372, 382, 390, 2:621. 
72  Hujwīrī, Kashf, 382; Kuşeyrî, Kuşeyri Risalesi, 24; Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 618. 
73  Muḥāsibī, Ādāb, 79-80. 
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quivocally. They accept the hierarchy of the supervisors over hu-
man beings as follows: intuition, human reason, and passion. Ac-
cording to most Sufis, the human reason is an apparatus to clean 
the heart that the knowledge of reality comes rather than an appa-
ratus to attain reality. Therefore, they suggest that a person cannot 
attain the knowledge of reality with books and scholars.  
As a result of this kind of claim, they criticize the outward 
scholars such as theologians, jurists, and all who depend on human 
reason. To them, human reason is useful to abide by religious 
commandments and prohibitions only. Whoever wants to have a 
grasp of reality should follow the way of taṣawwuf by disciplining 
the self. 
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Knowledge in the Main Sources of the Philosophy 
of Sufism in the Pre-Ghazzālī Period 
  
Emrah KAYA* 
 
Extended Abstract 
This article aims to elaborate on the pre-Ghazzālī period Sufis’ approaches to the 
concept of knowledge. The article consists of three main sections. At the begin-
ning, we will focus on description of taṣawwuf. And then, the concepts of 
knowledge and gnosis will be described. At the last section, the ideas of the Sufis 
on knowledge and its ways will be examined.  
In this article, I will study the pre-Ghazzālī period Sufis’ approaches to 
knowledge and human reason (ʿaql) with a philosophical perspective. Most of 
the Islamic philosophy researchers have been in agreement about that Ghazzālī 
(d. 505/1111) is a milestone in the Islamic thought. He engaged greatly in ra-
tional knowledge and wrote about theology, Islamic jurisprudence, logic, and 
philosophy. Afterward, he propounded that it is possible to attain the knowledge 
of reality by following the way of taṣawwuf only. To explain this way and its re-
liability, he wrote some books such as Iḥyā’ al-ʿulūm al-dīn, Mishkāt al-anwār, 
and Iljām al-ʿawām ʿan ʿilm al-kalām. This article focuses on the approach of the 
Sufis such as Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857), Abū Naṣr Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī (d. 988), Abū 
Bakr al-Kalābādhī (d. 990), Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 998), Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
al-Sulamī (d. 1021), ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwīrī (d. 1072), and ʿAbd al-
Karīm al-Qushayrī who lived in the pre-Ghazzālī period to human reason and ra-
tional knowledge. Those Sufis are the founders and the most important figures 
of the Sunnī taṣawwuf, which is the way that Ghazzālī followed. 
In general, we may describe taṣawwuf as one of the Islamic sciences and a disci-
pline that purposes a moral improvement and maturity of human beings. The 
foundation of taṣawwuf is based on the lifestyle of the Prophet Muhammad and 
his close companions (ṣaḥāba). Some Muslims after the Prophet had kept con-
tinuing this lifestyle, which is asceticism (zuhd) and piety (taqwā), for two cen-
turies. In the third and fourth centuries after the Prophet, some Muslims had 
added some other thoughts and teachings to this lifestyle so that, taṣawwuf 
came out. Hence, we may say that the concept of taṣawwuf includes some specif-
ic ideas in addition to the lifestyle based on asceticism and piety. 
As for the concepts of knowledge and gnosis, we should say first that these con-
cepts are intertwined in the discipline of taṣawwuf. Even though the Sufis used 
these concepts interchangeably, it is clear that gnosis is in a more notable posi-
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tion than knowledge. It is because while a person can acquire knowledge by his 
reason, gnosis is possible with mystical experiences and comes to the heart.  
As understood from those information, it can be said that the Sufis acknowledge 
two main ways to acquire knowledge. The first is the human reason, and the 
second is the intuition that involves the revelation, inspiration, unveiling, dream, 
and vision. The most remarkable point in the Sufis’ approaches to the human 
reason is that they consider it to be a mechanism controlling the self (nafs). Al-
most all Sufis give a place broadly for this subject. The human reason prevents 
the excessiveness of the self, keeps away human beings from Hell, eliminates the 
whispers of Satan, and it has to keep the self under control. On the other hand, 
Sufis often stress that the human reason is not capable of knowing about God. 
Sufis claim that the human reason has been incapable of understanding some of 
the thoughts that come to the heart. Besides the knowledge regarding God, 
knowledge concerning the nature of revelation, the essence of the soul, mystical 
states, the ascension of the Prophet, and miracles of the friends (awliyā’) exceed 
the limits of the human reason. We learn from those statements that Sufis accept 
the divine inspiration rather than the rational efforts to have a grasp of reality. 
They acknowledge the superiority of intuitional ways upon rational methods. 
According to them, while all sciences have a limit, gnosis has no end at all be-
cause it comes from God as a bestowal. They consider themselves to be the most 
qualified authorities after the prophets to understand the divine speech and to 
decree about religious issues. Their chests are open, hearts are bright (ḍiyā’), so 
their knowledge about God is very sound. Gnosis that they have is not something 
to understand by human reason and to reveal by writing in books. 
I conclude at the end of the research that the Sufis restrict human reason (ʿaql) 
into the worldly life while giving the intuitional knowledge priority. Also, they 
separate the reality (ḥaqīqa) from religious law (sharīʿa). For the former, intui-
tional knowledge is a necessity, while the human reason is useful and responsi-
ble for the latter.  
Keywords: Islamic Philosophy, Sufism, Human Reason, Knowledge, Gnosis. 
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